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I.  Introduction 
  The existence of wage differences among observationally equivalent workers has 
spawned a vast literature seeking to explain this apparent violation of the law of one 
price.  This effort has been very fruitful, enhancing economists’ interest in behavioral 
analysis of market phenomena and leading to many refinements of classical price theory.  
In this study we focus on one of those refinements:  the potential role of fairness 
considerations in determining the structure of wages.  If, for example, secretaries are paid 
more in the auto industry than in education and this wage premium is not explained by 
differences in worker quality and/or working conditions, then it is plausible to suppose 
fairness norms may explain some of the variance.  That is, if auto assembly line workers 
receive supra-competitive wages by virtue of their unions’ bargaining power, perhaps it is 
necessary or desirable to pay secretaries and other (non-unionized) workers in the 
industry wages above their opportunity costs, which we would call fairness premia. 
Failure to do so might lead these workers to conclude they are being treated inequitably 
and to reduce their level of effort or become less cooperative, as Akerlof and Yellen 
(1990) have suggested. 
  Many experiments and surveys have shown that fairness concerns are potentially 
important influences on employer and employee behavior, but there is little direct 
evidence that such concerns explain much observed variation in wages across or within 
industries.  Part of the problem is that the large datasets typically studied contain much 
descriptive detail on firm and worker characteristics but little on individual performance.  
  2In consequence, it is difficult to link observed wages to variables suggested by fair wage 
models, and it is often impossible to hold constant what is most important in explaining 
wages:  variation in the value of workers’ output.  Accordingly, we propose to analyze 
wage-setting in a single industry where we can avoid such problems. 
  In the baseball labor market, detailed and comprehensive data on employers’ 
revenues, employees’ output, and compensation enable us to construct variables needed 
to detect the presence of possible fairness premia.  What is more, these data are rich 
enough to measure not just an individual’s marginal physical product but its value.  This, 
it turns out, is an important distinction:  Merely controlling for variation in individual 
productivity (or productive capacity) in wage regressions may yield a distorted picture, 
for the value of a given employee’s output can vary considerably among employers due 
to differences in their market size or power.  We find that regressions which control for 
variation in workers’ physical productivity yield evidence consistent with fair wage 
models of employer behavior, but when we hold constant workers’ marginal revenue 
products (MRPs) this evidence evaporates.  So, while we ultimately find no support for 
fair wage theory in this market, this study demonstrates that imprecise or omitted 
measures of the value of workers’ output in studies of observed wage differences can lead 
to biased estimates of the contribution of fairness (or perhaps other, related behavioral 
concerns) to the structure of wages.
1
  In the next section we briefly summarize the literature on wage differentials and 
fair wage models.  Section III provides necessary institutional information on and 
                                                           
1 The idea that mis-measured (or unobservable) differences in workers’ productive capacity might play a 
large role in explaining observed wage differences was advanced by Murphy and Topel (1987) and further 
investigated by Gibbons and Katz (1992) and by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).  In effect, the 
present study suggests that even where ability differences are observable and measured perfectly, bias 
problems remain in wage regressions that do not contain workers’ MRPs because of variation in the value 
of otherwise-identical workers’ output from one industry or employer to another. 
  3analysis of the wage-setting process in the baseball labor market.  Section IV proceeds to 
direct tests for the presence of fairness premia in this market using two distinct data 
samples and a variety of specifications.  In both samples and in all specifications we find 
evidence of an illusory fairness effect—i.e., we detect fairness premia that disappear once 
accurate measures of individuals’ MRPs are included in wage regressions—and so 
conclude that fairness concerns are unimportant in explaining wage differentials in this 
market.  The final section considers whether our findings have broader implications for 
the literature on the structure of wages. 
 
II.  The Literature on Wage Differences and Fairness 
There is a positive relationship between firm size and wages that is well-
established, intertemporally stable, and internationally pervasive (see, e.g., Moore 1911, 
Brown and Medoff 1989; Oi and Idson 1999).  In addition, there is abundant evidence 
that certain industries pay higher wages than others, that inter-industry wage premia are 
not entirely explained by variance in worker characteristics or job conditions, and that 
such differences persist over time and across countries (Dickens and Katz 1987; Krueger 
and Summers 1988; Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999). 
In part to explain these facts, economists have developed several sophisticated 
refinements of classical price theory.  Among these are (i) the theory of compensating 
differentials, in which workers’ pay in certain firms or industries reflects the presence 
(absence) of various unfavorable (favorable) working conditions (Rosen 1986); (ii) 
agency theory, in which the costs of monitoring employees affects firms’ decisions about 
the quality and compensation of those they will hire (Oi 1983); (iii) efficiency-wage 
  4models, in which supra-competitive wages may be profit-maximizing because they 
enable firms to reduce shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) and turnover (Salop 1979), 
tap into a higher-quality job applicant pool (Weiss 1980), or avoid unionization (Dickens 
1986); and (iv) fair wage models, in which the degree to which workers exert effort or 
behave cooperatively is tied to their perceptions that they are being paid fairly (Akerlof 
and Yellen 1990).  The present study focuses on the latter. 
As economists have sought to incorporate the insights of psychologists in their 
models of market behavior, fairness considerations have become increasingly popular in 
explaining a variety of market anomalies, and there is ample experimental evidence that 
standards of fairness may have a role to play in explaining the structure of wages.  For 
example, several early experimental studies found that subjects reduced the quality of 
their work when paid less than the “going rate” (Lawler and O’Gara 1967), that arbitrary 
wage reductions led to reduced work quality and higher quit rates (Valenzi and Andrews 
1971; Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson 1972), and that pay inequalities reduced 
cooperation (Schmitt and Marwell 1972).  In a more recent experiment, subjects acting as 
employers were found to offer above-market wages in the hope that their workers would 
respond with higher levels of effort—and, on average, the subjects acting as employees 
did so (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl 1993).  There is also much anecdotal (Rees 1993) 
and survey evidence (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Blinder and Choi 1990) that 
employers and workers frequently use (or say they use) fairness considerations as 
important guides in making real-world labor market decisions. 
Yet there is remarkably little econometric evidence that fairness concerns are 
quantitatively significant in explaining observed differences in wages within and across 
  5industries.  One major problem is that it can be difficult to assemble data on variables 
suggested by fair wage models, especially the reference points employees or employers 
might use to determine what is fair.  As a result, researchers have often been limited to an 
approach that is sometimes referred to as “argument by elimination” (Krueger and 
Summers 1988, p. 281), in which as many non-fairness-related variables as possible (e.g., 
worker quality, working conditions, threat of unionization, demographics, and market 
concentration) are controlled for and remaining unexplained variance in wages is 
attributed to fairness considerations.  The problem here is clear:  the unexplained variance 
may also be tied to other omitted variables, including (but not limited to) unmeasured 
worker quality.  Attempts to resolve this problem with longitudinal data that includes 
workers who have moved from one firm or industry to another have produced mixed 
results, with some researchers concluding that unobserved worker quality largely 
explains away the wage differentials (Murphy and Topel 1987; Shippen 1999) while 
others conclude the opposite (Gibbons and Katz 1992; Blackburn and Neumark 1992). 
Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence (which appears to originate with 
Slichter 1950) that wage levels are correlated with an employer’s ability to pay, whether 
measured by the firm’s profitability or its market power.  One recent study has found 
that, ceteris paribus, in U.S. manufacturing a doubling of profitability leads after some 
years to an eight percent increase in wages (Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey 1996); 
another has found a positive correlation between profits and wages for Sweden (Arai 
2003).  Some have argued that such evidence supports fair wage models since “sharing 
rents is fair” (Thaler 1992, p. 45).  Here again, however, there are competing 
explanations.  Another recent study, for example, has found a positive correlation 
  6between wage dispersion and profits, and argues that this is more consistent with 
tournament-pay models, in which unequal rewards motivate greater effort, than with fair 
wage models (Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx 2004). 
By employing data from the major league baseball labor market, we believe we 
can avoid several of the problems that have arisen in studies of other industries.  First of 
all, the availability of individual and team compensation data enables us to construct 
variables necessary to test fair wage models directly rather than via “elimination.”  
Moreover, there is no need to use workers’ characteristics (whether observed or 
unobserved) as proxies for their productive capacity in these tests, for detailed and 
accurate measures of individual players’ marginal productivity are readily available, as 
are data about employers’ financial performance and market structure that are needed to 
accurately measure the value of workers’ output across firms.  Finally, some of the 
considerations that make the interpretation of data across a large number of industries 
(e.g., working conditions that require compensating differentials, or the threat of 
unionization) are absent here, enabling a focus on fairness.  Accordingly, this market 
provides a relatively clean and straightforward test of whether observed wage differences 
reflect fairness premia after controlling for variation in individual workers’ MRPs. 
 
III.  The Baseball Labor Market and Employer-Specific MRPs 
Thanks to the seminal work of Gerald Scully (1974) on pay and performance in 
baseball, calculating a ballplayer’s MRP involves a relatively straightforward two-step 
process.  One must first quantify the relationship between a team’s revenue and its output 
of wins (holding constant other possible influences on consumer demand, such as the 
  7amenity of a team’s stadium).  Second, one must quantify each player’s contribution of 
wins to his team (which is a by-product of myriad individual performance measures, from 
home runs or stolen bases for hitters to putouts or errors for fielders to strikeouts or hits 
allowed for pitchers).  Each player’s MRP is then equal to his marginal physical product 
(in wins) times the value of marginal wins (in dollars) to his team. 
One fact that is apparent to most observers of the baseball labor market is that the 
marginal revenue each team realizes for an extra game won—and therefore its players’ 
MRPs—will be positively correlated with the size of the market in which it plays, all else 
equal.  The greater the number of potential fans to whom a team can sell its products (not 
just tickets to games, but radio and television broadcasts and merchandise), the greater 
the revenue potential of each particular element of output players contribute on the field.  
In consequence, the same player will be worth more to large-market teams than small-
market ones, so that the former may tend to accumulate a disproportionate amount of the 
available talent and win more than their fair share of games.  In one early study 
(Sommers and Quinton 1982), the ratio of a player’s MRP in the largest to the smallest 
market was found to be roughly 2:1.  In recent years, however, the growth of pay-cable 
television has enabled teams to capture significantly greater revenue per potential 
consumer and has increased the importance of differences in the population base within 
teams’ market areas.
2  Accordingly, Burger and Walters (2003) have estimated that the 
current ratio of a player’s MRP in the largest to the smallest big-league market is roughly 
6:1.  For example, a player who could add five marginal wins (relative to an available 
alternative player) to his team’s total output would have a MRP of $18.1 million per year 
                                                           
2 In 1995, for example, locally-generated revenue (i.e., total revenue less receipts doled out equally to all 
clubs, such as national television rights fees) in the richest market exceeded that in the poorest by a ratio of 
5.5:1.  By 2001, that ratio was 22.3:1 (Levin, Mitchell, Volcker, and Will 2000; 2001). 
  8in the largest market (New York, where the Yankees and Mets share over 20 million 
potential fans), $8.1 million in a mid-sized market (Houston, with 4.5 million potential 
fans), and a mere $3.0 million in the smallest market (Milwaukee, with 1.65 million 
potential fans), in 1999 dollars and based on 1999 population figures (Burger and Walters 
2003, p. 119). 
When MRPs are affected by market size in this way, there are some interesting 
implications for the structure of observed wages.  For example, if two teams from 
markets of significantly different size are vying for the services of a particular player, the 
larger-market team can win the auction by simply bidding a tiny bit more than the 
player’s MRP in the smaller market.
3  Even in a perfect-information world in which all 
bidders estimate the player’s productivity identically and correctly, his wage rate need 
not equal his MRP in the market in which he ultimately lands unless his salary is the 
product of bidding between teams in identically-sized markets.  Viewed another way, 
teams lucky enough to inhabit larger markets may earn rents on particular players even if 
the bidding for their services involves several (smaller) competitors. 
More generally, if we rank each team i (where i = 1, 2, … 30 in major league 
baseball) according to the value of a marginal win (VMW) in its market, from the 
smallest to the largest, so that 
  V M W 1 < VMW2 < … VMW30,       ( 1 )  
then each player j with marginal productivity MWj (and, again, we assume a perfect-
information world where all teams share identical estimates of a player’s likely 
productivity) will face the following possible array of bids for his services: 
                                                           
3 Though it should be noted that if employers behave “irrationally”—if, e.g., they are willing to “pay any 
price to win”—and do not limit their wage offers to players’ MRPs in their market, the structure of wages 
may be markedly different from that described in the foregoing analysis. 
  9  M W j(VMW1) < MWj(VMW2) < … < MWj(VMW30).   (2) 
The wage each player on auction ultimately will receive therefore depends not just on his 
productivity but on the identities of the teams that choose to bid, their VMWs, and, 
perhaps, the player’s (or his agent’s) negotiating skill.  In contrast to markets where all 
employers attach the same marginal value to each unit of output a worker contributes, in 
this market competitive bidding need not drive employees’ wages to equality with their 
MRPs and with each other.  Instead, we can predict only that player j will play for the 
largest-market team that bids for his services
4 and that his wage (Wj) will be bounded by 
the VMWs of the two largest-market teams that bid for him: 
  M W j(VMWi) < Wj ≤ MWj(VMWi+1).    (3) 
Why don’t large-market teams bid for and acquire all the best talent?  The answer 
involves a combination of technical and institutional constraints on production in the 
baseball industry.  First, of course, only nine players can take the field at any time,
5 and 
so the marginal productivity of bench-warmers—even high-quality ones—is extremely 
limited.  Second, skills at one position often do not transfer to others.  Effectively, then, 
the production function here involves discontinuities.  If, for example, the largest-market 
team has hired the best first baseman available, it will be uninterested in bidding on the 
second-best, since he will rarely play at first base and likely be incompetent at other 
positions, driving his marginal product toward zero.  Third, the sport’s collective 
bargaining agreement allows players to auction their services (as “free agents”) to all 30 
teams only after they have accumulated six years of major league service time, prior to 
                                                           
4 It is not uncommon, however, for players to sacrifice some monetary income to play in markets pleasing 
to them for other reasons, e.g., proximity to their hometowns. 
5 Of course, ten players may contribute at one time in the American League, thanks to that league’s 
Designated Hitter rule. 
  10which teams hold a certain amount of monopsony power over them.  The degree of 
monopsony exploitation is greatest during players’ first two or three years of service, 
after which an arbitration system reduces but does not eliminate exploitation (see 
Marburger 1994; Burger and Walters 2005).  So, before bidding on free agents, large-
market teams rationally will fill as many positions as possible with low-seniority players 
on whom they are virtually assured rents.
6  Finally, large-market teams may leave some 
talent available for their smaller-market rivals in order to ensure that there is enough 
uncertainty in the outcome of games to keep customers interested in the sport, as 
Rottenberg (1956) has suggested. 
In any event, in this labor market there likely will be significant wage dispersion, 
and the observed variance in wages will depend not only on variance in worker quality or 
seniority (given the aforementioned institutional characteristics), but on variance in the 
size of markets.  Individual players’ wages will be positively correlated with—but not 
necessarily equal to—their MRPs in the markets in which they play.  As we attempt to 
explain variation in individual players’ wages and test whether they incorporate fairness 
premia, it will be important to incorporate firm-specific measures of each player’s value 
in our tests. 
 
IV.  Two Tests for Fairness Premia 
A.  The Basic Fair Wage Model 
  In the literature on fairness and wage determination, it is customary to argue that 
workers hold beliefs about the level of remuneration that is fair, that their beliefs are 
                                                           
6 It should be noted also that Coasian sales of high-quality, low-seniority players from small- to large-
market teams are prohibited by the sport’s Commissioner in order to “preserve competitive balance.”  
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industry, and that employers may be willing to pay fairness premia to close gaps between 
actual wages and those perceived as fair in order to forestall shirking or induce greater 
cooperation (Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Skott 2005).  In some formulations, the presence 
of a cohort of high-wage workers in a firm or industry is said to produce an “envy” effect 
in other cohorts (Strom 1995). 
  In the context of the major league baseball labor market, this literature suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, an individual player’s wage may be higher because of the presence 
on his team of a significant cohort of better-compensated players.  Failing to pay a player 
such a fairness premium—which we are effectively defining as a payment that is 
independent of the value of his output—risks shirking or uncooperative (i.e., selfish or 
non-team-oriented) behavior.  As noted earlier, baseball data are detailed enough to allow 
estimation of wage equations suitable for a variety of tests for the presence of such 
premia.  Not only are precise productivity measures available at the individual level (so 
that we can avoid relying on worker characteristics as proxies for performance, as many 
studies do), but firm data are available so that we can calculate MRPs for individual 
players and allow them to vary based on market size.  What is more, salary data are 
sufficiently widely-disseminated that players generally know what their teammates are 
being paid and can form beliefs about fair wages quite readily. 
  Accordingly, in this section we estimate wage regressions in which players’ 
salaries depend on (i) precise measures of their marginal productivity and, more 
importantly, its value to their employers, (ii) various individual characteristics that might 
affect their ability to bargain, and (iii) two alternative measures of their teams’ salary 
  12structures that might serve as reference points in determining whether payment of 
fairness premia is necessary.  Table 1 lists all variables used, describes their construction 
and their attributes, and identifies sources of data. 
  Of central interest are the two reference-point measures RP1 and RP2, which 
alternatively might be termed “envy indicators.”  RP1 equals the ratio of the subject 
player’s team’s total payroll to the average team’s payroll (so that values greater than one 
signal above-average levels of compensation paid by the team);  RP2 is a count of the 
number of highly-paid “star” players—defined as those earning more than 10 times the 
prevailing minimum salary—on the player’s team.  A positive coefficient on either of 
these measures would signal that, all else the same, the presence of a cohort of highly-
paid players on one’s team exerts an independent effect on one’s salary, and would 
support the idea that observed wages incorporate fairness premia.
7
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
   As a robustness check, we employ two distinct data samples to estimate these 
wage regressions.  In the next section we analyze a sample of second-year player salaries 
over the span of a decade.  By focusing on all sophomores who received votes in the 
previous year’s “rookie of the year” balloting (and who therefore established themselves 
as regulars on their teams), we hold constant players’ bargaining power, which is 
seniority-related.  Players in their second year of major league service are eligible for 
neither free agency nor salary arbitration.  As a result, any variation in their salaries that 
is not related to their productivity or its value can be said to result from bargaining 
between employees and employers rather than the decisions of an arbitrator or some other 
                                                           
7 An alternative approach suggested by the fairness literature would compare wages to firm profits, but 
measures of profits are notoriously unreliable in major league baseball, where, for a variety of reasons, 
team owners have a strong incentive to appear unprofitable (see e.g., Fort (2003, p. 117)). 
  13confounding factor.  After considering this special class of players, we then broaden our 
approach with cross-sectional analysis of all player salaries for a given year. 
 
B.  Sophomore Players, 1994-2004 
  Our sample of 178 second-year players includes all players from 1994-2004 who 
received at least one “rookie-of-the-year” vote after their initial season of major league 
service.  This sample selection technique allows us to focus on players that likely were 
expected by their teams to be significant contributors as sophomores.  Salaries for players 
in their first three years of service (pre-arbitration eligibility) are greatly influenced by 
the minimum salary set by the collective bargaining agreement.  Our empirical 
investigation must therefore take account of the fact that between 1994 and 2005 the 
minimum salary increased from $109,000 to $316,000.  In order to ensure that the 
dependent variable in our wage regressions is stationary, we calculate the ratio of the 
player’s sophomore salary to the minimum salary for that year (each converted into 1999 
dollars), labeled WRATIO.  By construction this salary ratio is bounded from below at 
one; therefore we use the maximum likelihood method to estimate a Tobit
8 for the 
following specifications:
 
  WRATIOt+1 = α +β1RP1 + β2Contract + β3MPt + ε,    (4) 
  WRATIOt+1 = α +β1RP2 + β2Contract + β3MPt + ε,    (5) 
  WRATIOt+1 = α +β1RP1 + β2Contract + β3MRPt + ε,    (6) 
  WRATIOt+1 = α +β1RP2 + β2Contract + β3MRPt + ε,    (7) 
                                                           
8 As it turns out, our results are identical to OLS because there was not a single sophomore player who was 
paid exactly the minimum salary.  This indicates that while teams hold considerable monopsony power 
over pre-arbitration-eligible players, they either (a) bump wages above the minimum for fairness reasons or 
(b) pay players a share of their MRP as a result of bargaining by the players or their agents.  These 
regressions resolve that question. 
  14where t denotes variables from the player’s rookie season and t+1 from his sophomore 
season; RP1 and RP2 are alternative reference points or “envy indicators,” described in 
Table 1, Contract is a dummy variable controlling for players who received major league 
contracts at their initial signing (as is often the case for players migrating from the 
Japanese professional leagues and, less often, for highly-sought amateurs), MP is the 
player’s marginal physical productivity, and MRP his marginal revenue product. 
  Specifications (4) and (5) investigate whether the sophomore salary ratio appears 
to be influenced by fairness concerns after controlling just for the physical productivity of 
the player.  For a concise, state-of-the-art measure of players’ overall contribution to their 
teams’ output of wins we rely on the research of James (2002), who has developed a 
method of translating all the various forms of output by hitters, fielders, and pitchers into 
a single statistic called Win Shares.
9  This measure of physical output can be easily 
combined with the Burger and Walters (2003) estimates of the value of marginal wins 
(VMWs) to calculate MRPs for individual players, used in specifcations (6) and (7). 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
  The first two columns of Table 2 contain evidence in support of the fair wage 
model.  In each case the coefficients for the reference points are positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that teams with higher-than-average payrolls (RP1) and/or a large 
number of highly paid players (RP2) pay more for players of a given ability.  In the next 
two specifications, however, we take the test a step further and control not just for a 
player’s physical productivity but for its value; our calculation of players’ MRPs allows 
                                                           
9 James is a founding father of the field of “sabermetrics,” or the application of statistical methods to the 
study of baseball.  His tools for evaluating individual player productivity are widely used by researchers, 
journalists, and teams themselves.  The central virtue of the Win Shares measure is that it ignores no 
element of player performance that can have an effect on team success; in that regard, it is far superior to 
less sophisticated methods of measuring productivity sometimes used in the sports economics literature 
(see, e.g., Scully (1974)). 
  15for the fact that a given amount of physical productivity will be worth more to larger-
market employers.  The results indicate that once we control for MRP, neither reference 
point (or envy indicator) exerts a statistically significant impact on wages.  In sum, in this 
sample we find no support for fair wage theory once we properly control for the value of 
players’ output in our wage regressions. 
  Given the well documented relationship between market size and team payrolls, 
one might be concerned with the possibility of multicollinearity driving the results in 
Table 2.  In fact there is a positive correlation between our reference point variables and  
MRP, but these correlations are relatively modest at 0.422 (for RP1) and 0.361 (RP2).  
More importantly, if collinearity were the culprit we would observe a substantial increase 
in the standard errors for the estimated coefficients on RP1 and RP2 in specifications (6) 
and (7).
10  To the contrary, these coefficients do not become statistically insignificant 
because of imprecise estimates; rather, introduction of the MRP measure dramatically 
decreases the size of the coefficients on these indicators. 
  Thus, the results in Table 2 suggest that controlling for worker productivity alone 
in wage studies—as is often done, either because of unavailability of data or a deep-
seated belief that the value of output is invariant across employers—may not be sufficient 
to properly test fair wage models.  Evidently, failing to measure workers’ MRPs 
reasonably accurately in wage regressions can introduce substantial bias into estimated 
coefficients; in this case, that bias creates an illusion that high-payroll or star-laden teams 
pay fairness premia to their lower-paid, second-year players.  Once specifications include 
accurate measures of players’ MRPs, however, there is no longer evidence that fairness 
considerations have a significant effect on player salaries. 
                                                           
10 See Griffiths, Hill and Judge (1993, p. 435). 
  16C.  A Cross-Section of All Players, 2003 
  We next test whether these results carry over to a much larger and diverse sample 
of players, including those with a wide range of experience and bargaining power—i.e., 
pre-arbitration players, arbitration-eligible players, and free agents.  As a rough control 
for both experience and bargaining power, we include the player’s age and age squared as 
explanatory variables in these cross-sectional regressions: 
  Wt = α +β1RP1 + β2Aget + β3Aget
2 + β4MPt + ε,    (8) 
  Wt = α +β1RP2 + β2Aget + β3Aget
2 + β4MPt + ε,    (9) 
  Wt = α +β1RP1 + β2Aget + β3Aget
2 + β4MRPt + ε,    (10) 
  Wt = α +β1RP2 + β2Aget + β3Aget
2 + β4MRPt + ε,    (11) 
  There are 608 usable observations in the 2003 sample after removing players who 
played for multiple teams, for whom salary information was unavailable, or whose 
playing time was limited (i.e., less than 100 at-bats or 30 innings pitched).  Player salary 
is the dependent variable in specifications (8) - (11); unlike the second-year player 
cohort, there is no need to form a stationary ratio in these cross-sectional regressions.  
The level of the dependent variable (salary) is censored from below at the minimum 
salary ($300k in 2003); therefore, we again employ Tobit estimation.
11
  Maximum likelihood results for specifications (8) and (9), presented in Table 3, 
mirror those reported for the sophomore class in Table 2.  Players appear to receive an 
envy-induced fairness premium when one simply controls for their physical output:  the 
coefficients on RP1 and RP2 are both positive and highly significant.  Once again, 
however, this premium evaporates when we replace MP with MRP in specifications (10) 
                                                           
11 Results from regressions on the natural log of salary follow the same pattern of the results reported in 
Table 3. 
  17and (11).  The positive impact of experience and bargaining power on player salaries is 
seen in the positive and significant coefficient on Age; the negative coefficient on Age
2 
reflects diminishing returns to experience. 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
  In sum, both tests performed in this section fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
fairness considerations have no effect on wages when a player’s value to his team is held 
constant.  In addition, the results reported in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that a fairness test 
which controls only for the physical productivity of the worker (or, one step removed 
from that, worker characteristics) but not the marginal value of the worker’s output may 
be misleading.  For major league baseball we find a wage structure that appears on the 
surface to be affected by fairness but that in reality reflects market-size-sensitive 
marginal revenue products.  In the concluding discussion we consider whether or not this 
result is specific to baseball. 
 
V.  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
  While it is common to suppose that “anomalous” wage differentials across and 
within industries may result from fairness considerations, the tests presented here 
challenge this view.  In this study we have avoided using proxies for the value of 
individual workers’ output by focusing on the baseball labor market, where data on 
individual performance and compensation are unusually detailed and precise.  We find 
that, while it is possible to infer that fairness considerations affect wages when individual 
employees’ physical productivity is held constant, this is an illusion resulting from the 
failure to recognize firm-specific differences in the value of output.  Once individual 
  18employees’ MRPs are held fixed, we find no support for fair wage theory in this market.  
This raises a provocative question:  Is this finding limited to baseball or do individual-
specific MRPs have broader power to explain intra- and inter-industry wage differentials? 
  Variation in workers’ MRPs will originate in either of two sources:  variance in 
workers’ physical productivity, and/or variance in the value of their output.  Yet 
consideration of these simple possibilities generally has not been emphasized in prior 
studies of wage differentials for two reasons.  First, neoclassical labor theory has 
conditioned us to assume that MRPs won’t vary across firms or industries, for if they did 
firms would hire more (less) labor until its MRP fell (rose) to the level of the market 
wage.  In baseball, of course, we directly observe constraints (the roster limits and 
position-specific skills discussed in section III) that create discontinuities in each firm’s 
production function, but it simply is not customary to think that such discontinuities, and 
resulting MRP inequalities, are common elsewhere.  Second, the data are often 
problematic.  The available data commonly involve large panels covering many 
occupations, firms, and industries, making measurement of workers’ marginal 
productivity at the individual level—much less the value of their individual output—
simply impossible.  As a result, we have tended to focus on proxies such as workers’ 
characteristics (and debated the role of unobserved characteristics) in explaining wage 
differentials.  Nevertheless, researchers have unearthed several findings that are quite 
consistent with MRP-based explanations for “anomalies” in the structure of wages. 
  Perhaps the closest proxy for workers’ MRPs was provided in one of the earliest 
inter-industry wage studies.  Slichter (1950) found a very strong rank correlation (0.93) 
between industries with high value added per worker-hour and those with high wages; he 
  19proposed a rent-sharing explanation for his findings but the results are also consistent 
with MRP variation across industries.  Although his value-added measure is an average, 
Slichter noted “it is quite possible that there is a tendency for the average value added to 
be high where marginal value added is high” (p. 87). 
  The literature on industry- or size-related wage premia also contains some 
findings consistent with market-size-related variance in MRPs.  For example, in the 
fairness literature the fact that such wage premia are associated with reduced turnover 
(Krueger and Summers 1988) and lower quit rates (Brown and Medoff 1989) has been 
interpreted as evidence that workers consider their wages to be in excess of their 
(uniform) opportunity costs.  But if MRPs vary across or within industries (e.g., rising 
with firm size), we will observe the same result:  workers are less likely to quit a job 
where their MRP is relatively high because they know they may have to take an 
alternative position where their MRP, and wage, is lower. 
  Evidence of size-related variation in MRP is provided by Idson and Oi (1999), 
who found that manufacturing labor is significantly more productive in larger plants, and 
who argued that wages rise with firm size because physical productivity does so for both 
service- and goods-producing industries.  They offered a host of reasons why this is so, 
from higher customer arrival rates and greater safety at larger workplaces (so that 
employee idle-time is minimized) to greater capital intensity resulting from lower capital 
costs.  Consistent with our results, Idson and Oi found that once productivity is controlled 
for the firm size-wage anomaly disappears. 
  The literature on urban agglomeration has also uncovered some regularities that 
are consistent with MRP-based explanations for wage differentials.  Glaeser and Mare 
  20(2001) demonstrated that, all else equal, workers in metropolitan areas receive wage 
premia, while Ciccone and Hall (1996) found a positive relationship between labor 
productivity and the density of economic activity.  Urban models posit explanations that 
include information externalities, reduced transaction costs, more extensive division of 
labor, economies of scale, and improved worker-firm matching.  Each of these theories 
suggests that the physical productivity of labor increases in dense markets, implying a 
higher MRP for workers in urban settings.  The lessons from the baseball labor market 
may be particularly appropriate in this literature.  While existing urban models emphasize 
variation in physical productivity as an explanation for wage premia, it seems plausible 
that a density or market-size effect on the marginal value of workers' output—analogous 
to that for large-market baseball teams—may also be present. 
  In sum, we believe that the baseball labor market holds some important lessons 
for those seeking to understand wage differentials.  We do not doubt that fair wage 
models or other theories advanced to explain apparent anomalies in labor markets can 
enhance understanding of employer and employee behavior.  We do wonder, however, 
whether properly measuring the value of individual workers’ output in studies of the 
structure of wages will lead to a significant reduction in the number of anomalies such 
theories need to explain. 
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Variable Description  Method of 
Calculation (Units)
Data Sources 
  Dependent Variables:    
WRATIOt+1  Ratio of player’s wage 
in year t+1 to the 
minimum allowable 





Wt  Player’s wage in year t  (millions of real 
1999 dollars) 
baseballgraphs.com/2003 
 Independent  Variables:    
  (i) Productivity     
MPt  Player’s marginal 
productivity above that 
of an available 
replacement-quality 
player in year t 
Win Shares/3, 
since Win Shares 
are reported as 




MRPt  Player’s market-specific 
marginal revenue 
product in year t 
MPt x market-
specific marginal 
revenue per win 
(millions of real 
1999 dollars) 
Burger and Walters (2003) 
  (ii) Controls     
Contract  Dummy variable, = 1 if 
player received a major-
league contract at initial 
signing 
(0, 1)  baseball-reference.com 
Aget  Player’s age in year t  (years)  baseball-reference.com 
  (iii) Reference points     
RP1  “Envy indicator” equal 
to ratio of player’s 
team’s total payroll to 






RP2  “Envy indicator” equal 
to number of superstar-
level salaries on player’s 
team 
Count of players 




























































































No.  of  Observations  178 178 178 178 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is WRATIO, the ratio of the player’s second-year salary to the 
league minimum (each in 1999 dollars).  Standard Errors are in parentheses; *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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No.  of  Observations  608 608 608 608 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is W, player salary in millions of real (1999) dollars.  
Standard Errors are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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